Basically, there are two types of law, and both carry equal weight in the courts (unless they contradict each other).

•Case Law or Common Law is based on previous judgments in the ‘higher’ courts (courts of appeal). These previous judgments are called ‘precedents’, and you can quote them in court just like quoting from an act of Parliament.

•Statute Law is just another name for the laws passed by Parliament (‘acts’). Statute Law takes priority over Case Law if there’s a conflict between the two.

To be able to use Case Law in court, the case has to come from the right court to be classed as official ‘precedent’—basically, that means a court of appeal or the House of Lords. A court case heard before a jury in the Crown Court won’t count in the Magistrates’ Court (though it may still be worth referring to).

Also, you need to know the name and ‘reference’ for the relevant judgment. Each judgment has a short name, based on the ‘parties’ in the court case: usually one party is “DPP” for “Director of Public Prosecutions,” or “R” for “Rex”/“Regina” (King/Queen in Latin), and the other party is the original defendant (eg activist). But each judgment is also reported in one of the standard law journals, and it’s the reference to this report that you’re supposed to quote in court.

The reference will be something like “[1995] 3 All E.R. 124,” which means “year 1995, volume 3, All England Reports, page 124.” Every reference has this general form: you just quote the reference in court. You don’t have to know what the abbreviations like “All E.R.” stand for, although the notes on cases that are linked from this page will tell you.

There are more notes on these legal principles and language at the following webpages:

•http://www.andrewgray.uklinux.net/tpwiki/wiki.pl?LegalPrinciples: basic legal ideas, like which courts overrule which and how to interpret judgments.

•http://www.andrewgray.uklinux.net/tpwiki/wiki.pl?LegalLanguage: various pedantic conventions which will help you gain credibility if you’re representing yourself (like how to pronounce judges’ titles or to read out the names of cases).

Both pages include contributions by River~~, including a note that English court judgments should never be spelt “judgement”—I have therefore corrected all the briefings below! They belong to a collaborative website for legal discussions, to which anyone is encouraged to contribute.

I have written notes on various cases that may be of use to TPers. I have subdivided the cases according to the ‘offence’ charged or (for a few cases) the variety of general ‘legal defence’ used. Copies of the judgments themselves are not on this website (but see below). Some time, I will add in a page of links to various resources on the internet, where you may be able to find more information, including full-text copies of judgments.

Please let me know if you have any comments, queries, corrections, ideas or additions for these notes. I also have copies of the full judgments in most of the cases mentioned here (plus some others), if needed.

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This document was last revised: 11/12/2001 (The briefings are revised separately. They each have their own revision date.)

The necessity defence

R v Martin, 1988
This is a case about driving while disqualified, but is used to set out the general conditions for a defence of “necessity” to succeed.

R v Pommell, 1995
Established that “necessity” defence could apply, even in a situation where the danger of death or serious injury had passed and was no longer ‘urgent’ or ‘immediate’.

Criminal Damage

Chamberlain v Lindon, 1998
Upholds a ‘lawful excuse’ defence (of damaging property in order to protect other property), allowing the defendant to destroy an obstruction that was blocking his right of way, even though he did not immediately destroy the obstruction.

R v Hill & Hall, 1988
An unfriendly case about anti-nuclear protestors, so often used against us, to limit the “lawful excuse” defence under the Criminal Damage Act

Aggravated Trespass

Aggravated Trespass
A quick summary and copy of the law relating to aggravated trespass

DPP v Barnard et al, 1999
The act of trespass is not sufficient to convict under s.68: you have to have done something else disruptive as well.

Winder et al v DPP, 1996
Allows magistrates to convict under s.68 even when no actual disruptive activity was carried out

Nelder et al v DPP, 1998
May be used against you if you try to argue that, at the particular time while you were causing some disruption, the activity disrupted was not itself lawful.

Hibberd v DPP, 1996
May be used against you if you try to argue that you were disrupting an activity that was being carried out in an unlawful way and therefore not a “lawful activity” for the purposes of s.68.

Capon et al v DPP, 1998
The only s.69 case (?): says that a policeman may be wrong in believing that you are about to commit a s.68 offence and asking you to leave, but that it’s still an offence to ignore the police warning!

Breach of the Peace

Note that these cases are for English Breach of the Peace: Scottish law is completely different.

Percy v DPP, 1994
Comprehensive and useful case that ties down what is a ‘breach of the peace’: must involve violence or a threat of violence. The threat of violence may come from a third party, but this must be a real risk not just a possibility. Also a criminal ‘burden of proof’ (“beyond reasonable doubt”) applies.

Obstruction of the Highway

Hirst & Agu v Ch Const W Yorks, 1986
Establishes what is meant by “lawful excuse” when defending an Obstruction of the Highway charge. Useful for an otherwise ‘fluffy’ demonstration that blocks a road, but less useful for a blockade-type demo on a highway.

Birch v DPP, 1999
A bad case. Severely limits rights of defendant to present evidence about unlawful activities in connection with an obstruction of the highway charge.

Public Order Act

DPP v Jones & Lloyd, 1999
House of Lords ruling establishing a right to demonstrate on the highway, so long as the assembly is peaceful, not obstructive and not a public or private nuisance, despite a “trespassory assembly” order (Public Order Act, s14A). Could be useful for other public order or obstruction charges too.

Broadwith v Ch Const TVP, 2000
This case upheld a conviction against a protestor who defied a condition imposed by Thames Valley Police (TVP) on a demonstration under section 14 of the Public Order Act (hereafter “s.14”), even though he was not part of an “assembly” at the time of his arrest. It potentially closes off one avenue of legal challenge to charges under this section.

Obstruction of the Police

Hinchliffe v Sheldon
A classic case for defining in very broad (‘catch-all’) terms the definition of “obstruction” (and so favoured by the prosecution!).

Rice v Connolly
An important case for limiting the scope of ‘obstruction’, by saying that you could not be convicted of obstruction for refusing to do something which you have a legal right not to do.

Ricketts v Cox
This judgment ruled that silence or refusal to answer questions from the police could amount to obstruction, depending on the circumstances (despite the ruling in Rice v Connolly).

Dibble v Ingleton
A clear summary of what can amount to obstruction, particularly regarding the question of whether a refusal to act can be an obstruction, as opposed to a positive act.

Lunt v DPP, 1993
An unpleasant (and odd) case that suggests that if the police have a right to use force to admit entry, then refusal to admit entry can amount to obstruction.

Various obstruction cases
These cases all relate to intention and motivation for the alleged obstruction. They are only summarised very briefly here. They are Willmott v Attack, Hills v Ellis and Lewis v Cox.

Miscellanea

Just occasionally, even Domestic Law comes out with an inspirational comment. Here’s one, from the case of R v Howe et al, 1987 (references [1987] AC 417 and 85 Cr App R 32):

I begin by affirming that, while there can never be a direct correspondence between law and morality, an attempt to divorce the two entirely is and has always proved to be, doomed to failure, and, in the present case, the overriding objects of the criminal law must be to protect innocent lives and to set a standard of conduct which ordinary men and women are expected to observe if they are to avoid criminal responsibility. (Lord Hailsham of Marylebone, LC, at page 430/40)