Public Order Act 1986, section 14. This case upheld a conviction against a protestor who defied a condition imposed by Thames Valley Police (TVP) on a demonstration under section 14 of the Public Order Act (hereafter “s.14”), even though he was not part of an “assembly” at the time of his arrest. It potentially closes off one avenue of legal challenge to charges under this section.
The law journal reference to this case (which you are supposed to use in court) is [2000] CrimLR 924, which you would read out in court as “year 2000, Criminal Law Review, page 924:” this is a summary report but not a full transcript. My transcript of the case comes from the Smith-Bernal website. There is also an article about the case by Neil Parpworth, in Justice of the Peace, volume 164, number 20 (13/5/2000), page 376.
A demonstration was planned in December 1998 at Hill Grove cat breeding farm in Witney, Oxfordshire. The police used their powers under s.14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on the demonstration (“static assembly”). The conditions imposed were in two main parts:
1)For the assembly to be held at Ducklington Lane in Witney, there was a condition limiting the place where the assembly could be held.
2)For the anticipated further assembly at Burford Road in Witney, there was a condition limiting the time of the assembly: to start not before 1:30pm, and to end by 4pm.
Broadwith did not take part in the first assembly, at Ducklington Lane, but went straight to the second. He was arrested at 1pm for not complying with the s.14 order, after trying to walk past police who had closed off Burford Road (until 1:30pm). He was walking away from a group of protestors at the time—the rest of the group was about 100 yards away, awaiting the arrival of the main demonstration that was walking from Ducklington Lane.
He was convicted by Witney Stipendiary Magistrate.[note] He appealed by ‘stated case’ (i.e. on a matter of law) to the ‘Divisional Court’. His appeal was rejected—this is the judgment of the Divisional Court in rejecting his appeal.
The defence case was based entirely on the s.14 order and charge. There were two parts of the defence:
1)The s.14 order was for two assemblies. Broadwith only went to the second assembly, and therefore was not bound by the s.14 order.
2)in any case, he was not part of an assembly (of 20 or more people) at the time of his arrest—in fact, he was walking away from the group.
The first point was dismissed because the s.14 order was considered clear enough in prohibiting an assembly at Burford Road before 1:30pm, and therefore it did apply to Broadwith, whether or not he had been to the first assembly (at Ducklington Lane).
The second point was also dismissed. Best just to quote the judge for this:
First of all, groups, whether they be of 20 or more or less than that size, can only consist of individuals. It may be necessary according to the particular circumstances, in order to ensure that an assembly proceeds on permitted lines, to take steps in relation to controlling the movements of particular individuals.
Furthermore, it is not, to my mind, an accurate description of the appellant as being not part of an assembly because he was walking away from the other larger group. The fact is that, although he was so walking, he had come with others intending to demonstrate. . . . (Rose LJ, from paragraphs 28–29)
As this case is not reported, it might not be used by the prosecution against you, so you might get away with ignoring it. However, it has been summarised in the Justices of the Peace magazine, and is obviously known to Thames Valley Police at least.[note]
The article on the case (see start of briefing for reference) suggests that its effect is “to firmly close the door” on the possibility of individuals freeing themselves from the constraints of a s.14 order by claiming not to be part of the main demonstration or ‘assembly’. If you want to use that kind of technical, legal challenge to a charge under s.14, you will have to find ways of distinguishing your situation from Broadwith.
A better course may be to challenge the legality of a s.14 order itself. In theory, such an order can be challenged by way of judicial review, although as it is usually imposed at short notice (possibly even while a demonstration is in progress), that is generally not possible or useful. Instead, you can make a “colateral challenge” to the s.14 order as part of your defence case.
Useful for such a challenge might be Neil Parpworth’s comments in the above article, in which he writes:
The power to impose conditions upon public assemblies under s.14 of the Public Order Act 1986 must therefore be exercised with care. Moreover, in terms of the context, conditions ought to be proportionate. They should only limit the freedom to assembly to the extent that is strictly required to preserve public order. (Neil Parpworth, in Justices of the Peace, 13/5/2000)
Even the government’s White Paper which preceded the Public Order Act 1986[note] recognises that it is important “to prevent the imposition of conditions whose effect would be tantamount to a ban” (paragraph 5.6), and states at paragraph 5.11, “It is not envisaged that the police will need formally to impose conditions at all frequently.”[note]
Anything that suggests that a s.14 order is seen as a routine way of policing demonstrations or is used primarily to limit the rights to protest should be regarded as open to challenge. Note that the White Paper and act are clear that conditions imposed under s.14 (or s.12) of the act are open to judicial review, and case law confirms that a colateral challenge such as that suggested is valid as a defence in law.[note]
© Copyright 2001, Andrew Gray
What, “copyright”! Isn’t copyright evil? [ You better read these notes]
This briefing was written by me (with or without help from others) for Trident Ploughshares, but may be used freely and copied/distributed by others. In order to guarantee this freedom, the briefing is copyrighted and licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License (formal license statement follows).
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I am not a lawyer. The briefing is not guaranteed in any way, and is not a substitute for proper legal advice. Feedback and corrections are very welcome, phone 0845 4588 368, email andrew@andrewgray.uklinux.net.
Andrew Gray, TP legal support (England & Wales)
This briefing was last revised: 11/12/2001
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