Obstruction of the Police. A clear summary of what can amount to obstruction, particularly regarding the question of whether a refusal to act can be an obstruction, as opposed to a positive act.
The references to this case in the law journals (which you are supposed to quote in court) are [1972] 1 QB 480 and [1972] 1 AllER 275,[note] which you read out as, “1972 volume 1, Queen’s Bench, page 480” and “1972 volume 1, All England Reports, page 275.” My transcript (and all the page references below) come from the AllER version.
This arose from a ‘drink driving’ case. Dibble had been stopped for driving a car that was not showing proper lights, and the policeman then smelled alcohol. He therefore used his powers to require Dibble to provide a breath specimen for a test. But because Dibble had only just been drinking, the policeman had to make him wait a while before taking the test.[note]
After a while, the policeman agreed that Dibble could visit his brother’s house nearby to use the toilet, accompanied by the policeman. On the way there, they met Dibble’s brother and another man who had been a passenger in the car, and who was carrying a bottle of whisky. Dibble took the bottle and had a swig of whisky. This meant that the breath test would be invalid.[note]
Dibble was convicted of obstruction by Folkestone magistrates, but appealed to Folkestone Quarter Sessions.[note] The Quarter Sessions upheld his appeal, throwing out the case on a “no case to answer” plea. The prosecutor appealed by ‘case stated’ (i.e. on a matter of law): this is the decision of the Divisional Court in upholding the prosecutor’s appeal and reinstating the conviction.
The defence case was that the act amounting to obstruction had to be itself unlawful, and so Dibble should not have been convicted for just taking a drink of whisky. This argument was accepted by the Recorder[note] in the Quarter Sessions appeal. It’s rejected by the judges in this appeal:
I can see no basis in principle or in any authority which has been cited for saying that [the obstruction] . . . must be unlawful independently of its operation as an obstruction. . . (Bridge, J, at page 279g)
However, the interesting bit of the judgment is the point made just before this one:
For my part I would draw a clear distinction between a refusal to act, on the one hand, and the doing of some positive act on the other. [refers to Rice v Connolly case, for which see separate TP briefing, and continues] . . . such a refusal to act cannot amount to a wilful obstruction under s 51 unless the law imposes on the person concerned some obligation in the circumstances to act in the manner requested by the police officer. (Bridge, J, at page 279f–g)
This point is further emphasised by Chief Justice Widgery, who states merely:
I agree with the judgment of Bridge J, particularly I would emphasise the importance of his distinction between obstruction which is alleged to consist of a default, and obstruction which is alleged to consist of a positive act. (Widgery, CJ, at page 280a)
This case effectively reinforces (and generalises) the Rice v Connolly case, and makes it difficult (but not necessarily impossible) for the prosecution to prove an obstruction case where the alleged obstruction consists in not doing something, rather than in doing something positively obstructive.
© Copyright 2001, Andrew Gray
What, “copyright”! Isn’t copyright evil? [ You better read these notes]
This briefing was written by me (with or without help from others) for Trident Ploughshares, but may be used freely and copied/distributed by others. In order to guarantee this freedom, the briefing is copyrighted and licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License (formal license statement follows).
Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.1 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled “GNU Free Documentation License.”
I am not a lawyer. The briefing is not guaranteed in any way, and is not a substitute for proper legal advice. Feedback and corrections are very welcome, phone 0845 4588 368, email andrew@andrewgray.uklinux.net.
Andrew Gray, TP legal support (England & Wales)
This briefing was last revised: 11/12/2001
(See the changelog and authorship page for revision details.)